The New Brunswick Court of Appeal has upheld Definity Insurance Company's payment of 30 cents per kilometre for an accident victim's treatment-related travel, while making clear that an insurer cannot make its chosen rate binding on the person it insures.
In Prestidge v. Definity Insurance Company, 2026 NBCA 49, released May 7, 2026, the court dismissed Jaclyn Prestidge's appeal and ordered her to pay $1,500 in costs. The ruling turned on the evidence in her case, not on a province-wide finding that 30 cents is always enough.
A request for 57 cents per kilometre
Prestidge was injured in a motor vehicle accident on June 4, 2024. She drove her own vehicle from her Moncton home to treatment appointments, making two-kilometre round trips for physiotherapy and ten-kilometre round trips for massage therapy.
Definity accepted that her transportation costs were covered under the accident-benefits section of her standard automobile policy and paid 30 cents per kilometre. Prestidge sought 57 cents per kilometre for the benefit period, together with arrears from the accident date.
She relied on government employee travel allowances and an earlier New Brunswick decision, Bradley v. TD Insurance, which had approved 57 cents in another case. Her affidavit identified expenses associated with owning and operating a vehicle, including fuel, insurance, maintenance and repairs. But she did not provide evidence of what her actual vehicle expenses were.
A Court of King's Bench judge dismissed her application on September 2, 2025, finding Definity's rate reasonable on the evidence. Prestidge challenged that conclusion, the treatment of the earlier decision and the judge's comments about insurer discretion.
No universal rate
Justice LaVigne, writing for a unanimous appeal panel, explained that neither the Insurance Act nor the standard automobile policy specifies a mileage rate or a formula for calculating one.
The governing obligation is to reimburse reasonable expenses, not necessarily all actual expenses. Both actual costs and government reimbursement rates can help a judge decide what is reasonable, but neither settles the question by itself.
The court distinguished cases awarding travel expenses against the person responsible for an accident. Those cases did not involve the same statutory and contractual limits governing no-fault insurance benefits. The different rates in the authorities also showed that more than one rate could be reasonable.
Prestidge bore the burden of establishing her case. The appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment, the demanding standard governing this mixed question of fact and law. Her lack of evidence about actual costs mattered; the court did not turn government employee rates into a mandatory insurance tariff.
The earlier decision did not bind the judge
The court also rejected the argument that Bradley required the same result. Generally, a superior court judge must follow a binding legal ruling from another judge of the same provincial court, subject to recognized exceptions. One exception concerns a decision made without full consideration.
Bradley was undefended and unopposed. Its entire hearing transcript, including the oral decision, occupied three pages, without analysis of the policy, legislation or case law. The judge had also expressly declined to establish a general mileage precedent and said individual cases should be assessed on their own facts.
The appeal court concluded that Bradley had not been fully considered and did not bind the application judge.
Insurers do not have the final say
The court drew an important distinction between selecting a rate initially and having an unrestricted right to dictate the result. Once transportation coverage is accepted, an insurer can choose a rate it considers reasonable so that payments can begin. The insured remains free to disagree and ask a court to determine the appropriate rate.
Prestidge argued that the application judge had treated proof of arbitrary conduct, capriciousness or bad faith as a prerequisite to court intervention. The appeal court rejected that reading. A judge could intervene if the rate was unreasonable, or if a reasonable rate had nevertheless been chosen arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith. There was no evidence or allegation of such misconduct by Definity in this case.
The panel did not decide the broader question of whether transportation costs must be covered under the policy in every case. Definity had accepted coverage, so entitlement was not in dispute. Comments about that broader issue were unnecessary to deciding Prestidge's claim.
The result leaves the 30-cent rate intact for this claim. It does not establish that rate as a ceiling or prevent another insured from challenging a different assessment on a fuller factual record.
