Prince Edward Island’s planning appeal tribunal dismissed a homeowner’s late challenge to a permit refusal while acknowledging that the notice process had treated him unfairly.
In Barlow v. Minister of Housing, Land and Communities, 2026 PEIRAC 14, Order LA26-05, issued March 27, 2026, the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission found that Johnnie Barlow’s appeal fell outside the Planning Act’s 21-day filing period. The commission said it had no authority to extend that statutory deadline, even in extenuating circumstances.
The ruling ended the appeal on jurisdictional grounds. It did not decide whether the proposed accessory structure should receive a development permit.
Letter arrived after public notice
The minister refused the permit on September 24, 2025, because the proposed location did not comply with required setbacks. Notice of the refusal appeared on the provincial planning-decisions website the following day. Barlow filed his appeal on November 5.
Barlow said he received notice of the registered letter on October 23 and collected it that day. He attributed the delay to Canada Post labour disruptions and other circumstances, including his contention that the decision had initially been sent to the property’s previous owners. Those explanations were his submissions, not findings establishing the cause of the postal delay.
He argued that the appeal clock should start when he physically received the decision. He had not known he needed to check online for it.
The minister maintained that the statutory deadline barred the appeal. It relied on the September 25 online posting and said information about the decision was available on request during business hours at the provincial planning office in Charlottetown.
Public notice did not depend on delivery
The commission considered the Act’s public-notice requirements, which call for notice on a publicly accessible website and at specified government or municipal locations. It found that the minister had complied with section 23.1. Receiving the registered letter was therefore not the event that started Barlow’s appeal period.
The reasons traced the notice rule to the earlier Booth and Peake appeal decision. Before the legislature standardized public notice in 2009, the Court of Appeal had recognized that some notice—personal or public—was necessary before an appeal period could run. IRAC treated compliant public notice as sufficient under the statutory scheme now before it.
The commission initially identified October 15 as the deadline calculated from the September 24 decision. But it expressly declined to decide whether the next-day posting affected that calculation: the November 5 filing was late either way. The ruling should not be read as settling that one-day issue.
Unfairness without power to extend
IRAC nevertheless recognized unfairness because Barlow had waited for personal notice without being told the decision would be posted online. It encouraged the minister to consider that problem going forward.
That criticism did not create jurisdiction the legislature had withheld. The commission dismissed the appeal, leaving the merits of the permit refusal unexamined.
