The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal has ordered North Horizon Immigration Consulting Inc. to compensate a former employee after finding that a misunderstanding about her return from maternity leave developed into discriminatory treatment and dismissal.
In a March 12, 2026 decision, tribunal member Beverly Froese found that Estherly Castro Mosquera’s sex and family status were factors in the humiliating treatment she experienced and the termination of her employment. The tribunal awarded $21,350.40 in lost wages, $20,000 for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect, and $3,688 in expenses, plus interest.
The result was mixed. Froese dismissed the separate retaliation complaint and refused an $8,505 claim for immigration-consulting course tuition. The decision also accepted important parts of the employer’s evidence, including its earlier support for Mosquera and the owner’s genuine belief that they had agreed on a full-time return.
A misunderstanding about returning to work
Mosquera joined North Horizon in 2017 as an immigration consulting assistant. Before her maternity leave began in January 2019, she worked part-time with flexibility over her hours and the ability to work remotely. Owner and chief executive Rita Benkhalti regarded her as a capable, reliable employee. They had discussed Mosquera obtaining an immigration consulting licence and eventually taking on a larger role in the business.
Their expectations diverged while Mosquera was on leave. Benkhalti believed Mosquera would return full-time at the office. Mosquera expected to retain flexibility similar to her previous arrangement while she completed her course. The disagreement became apparent in January 2020, shortly before she was due back, when they discussed her availability and childcare obligations.
Froese found that no verbal agreement for a full-time return had been made during a May 2019 shopping trip. A contemporaneous reference letter supported Mosquera’s understanding that she would work part-time while studying and full-time after becoming licensed. The tribunal nevertheless accepted that Benkhalti genuinely believed an agreement existed. It generally attributed conflicting accounts to the misunderstanding, fading memories and different perceptions rather than dishonesty by the witnesses.
The problem was how the employer responded once the mismatch emerged. Froese found that Benkhalti assumed Mosquera had deliberately deceived her rather than considering an honest misunderstanding. The owner told Mosquera she was seeking “special privileges” “just because she is a mother,” and began questioning her motivation and suitability for the expanded role they had discussed.
Contract questions did not amount to repudiation
North Horizon sent Mosquera a proposed employment contract reflecting their discussions about a flexible return. Mosquera asked questions about its terms, including an apparent tension between language allowing mutually agreed changes and a clause reserving the employer’s ability to make reasonable revisions as circumstances required.
The tribunal found those questions legitimate. Mosquera repeatedly said she was ready to return to work and was seeking clarification rather than trying to renegotiate or control the business. Froese rejected the employer’s characterization of her as someone seeking the authority of a business partner.
The decision did not fault Benkhalti simply for wanting legal advice. Froese accepted that it was reasonable to be concerned about questions arriving on the Friday evening before the planned return and not to answer hastily without advice. But that did not explain treating the questions as demands or concluding that Mosquera had rejected the employment relationship.
The tribunal also rejected parts of Mosquera’s account of the proposed contract. It found that North Horizon had not imposed significant unilateral changes to her duties, hours or schedule, and that there was no evidence it intended to erase her previous service through a new probationary period.
Counselling was a more nuanced issue. Froese accepted that Benkhalti reasonably believed they had mutually agreed Mosquera would attend counselling. At the same time, she accepted Mosquera’s evidence that she agreed because she felt she had to in order to return. Requiring counselling before and after the return therefore constituted an adverse impact in these circumstances; the tribunal did not find that Benkhalti had unilaterally imposed it.
North Horizon prevented Mosquera from returning as scheduled and later ended her employment. Froese found that Mosquera had not repudiated an existing contract or the proposed arrangements: she had not refused to work or perform her duties unless demands were met. The decision expressly states that the employer’s lawyer did not advise ending her employment.
Sex and family status were factors
Froese treated the complaint as direct discrimination in the employer’s conduct, rather than a claim that a neutral work rule conflicted with a substantial family obligation. The tribunal drew the connection to sex and family status from the timing of the events, the comments about motherhood, and the employer’s perception that childcare obligations made Mosquera unreliable and likely to keep demanding changes.
The reasons do not establish a general entitlement for employees to choose their schedules or work remotely. Mosquera did not argue that requiring a standard schedule was itself discriminatory or that she could dictate her employment terms. North Horizon did not advance a bona fide occupational requirement defence.
The tribunal accepted evidence that the company had supported Mosquera’s family responsibilities and professional ambitions, and that other employees felt supported at work. It also accepted that Benkhalti took her legal obligations seriously. Those findings did not defeat the complaint: discriminatory intent was unnecessary, and the question was whether protected characteristics were factors in the adverse treatment.
Retaliation was not proved
The separate retaliation allegation required its own analysis. An email in which Mosquera raised human rights concerns was not admitted into evidence. The limited evidence about its contents did not establish that North Horizon knew she might make a complaint under the Human Rights Code.
Froese also found that the claim would fail even if the employer had known. Before the email, Benkhalti was already reconsidering Mosquera’s future at the company and had told her she could seek work elsewhere. The timing did not establish that the dismissal occurred because of a prospective human rights complaint. That conclusion left the discrimination finding intact.
Compensation and interest
The wage award covered the period between the termination and Mosquera’s new employment in October 2020. Froese found that she made reasonable efforts to find other work and that North Horizon had not shown a failure to mitigate. The $21,350.40 award reflected a deduction for amounts already paid.
Mosquera sought $50,000 for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. Froese awarded $20,000 after considering the dismissal, her vulnerability, the length of her employment, the roughly month-long period of discrimination and its effects. These damages compensate for the harm; they are not a fine.
The $3,688 expense award comprised $3,020.50 in legal fees accepted as having been incurred before the human rights complaint was filed, plus $667.50 in medical expenses caused by the discrimination. It was not an award of all legal fees for conducting the hearing. The tuition claim failed because the expense was not caused by the discrimination and there was no evidence the company had promised to pay or reimburse it.
In its final orders, the tribunal declared that North Horizon had discriminated and directed it to cease and refrain from the same or similar contraventions. It ordered the three compensation amounts, prejudgment interest on lost wages and expenses, and postjudgment interest on all three awards from the decision date until payment in full, at the rates under the Court Order Interest Act. The reasons do not establish that the amounts have been paid.
Source: Castro Mosquera v. North Horizon Immigration Consulting Inc., 2026 BCHRT 61, March 12, 2026, file CS-003472.
