
A Saskatchewan judge has ruled that royalties from a new oil well must be invested for an estate’s remainder beneficiaries, rather than paid to the deceased’s widow, while declining to remove the two executors who had interpreted the will differently.
In Krell Estate v. Knoch, 2026 SKKB 51, Justice P.T. Bergbusch found that William Krell’s will gave his wife, Ruth, a limited royalty entitlement. It covered benefits he was receiving when he died, not every future payment arising from the mineral parcel. The March 5 decision also rejected alternatives that would have routed the disputed money through the estate’s residue or distributed it immediately.
A new lease after the death
William’s 2013 will directed his trustees to hold the mineral parcel during Ruth’s lifetime and pay her “all royalty or other benefits being received by me at the time of my death.” After her death, the interest was to pass in equal shares to his son and 19 nieces and nephews.
An older well had produced continuously since 2006. Crescent Point drilled a second well in 2015, mistakenly believing its lease still covered that part of the parcel. It briefly produced royalties before being shut in. William challenged the company’s authority, and negotiations for a replacement lease remained unresolved when he died in June 2016.
His executors, Ruth and his sister Violet Jacob, subsequently concluded a lease providing a $50,000 bonus and a 19 per cent royalty. Production resumed in February 2018. Ruth received the bonus and royalties, but five remainder beneficiaries disputed her entitlement and sought the executors’ removal.
Context could illuminate, but not rewrite, the will
The court considered the will as a whole and the circumstances William knew when he signed it. Bergbusch accepted an approach that considers surrounding circumstances from the outset, rather than admitting that context only after finding ambiguity. The objective remained the intention expressed in the will, not a new disposition based on what William might have wanted.
That distinction shaped the evidence. The court excluded drafting instructions and opinions about William’s intentions, along with speculation and argument. Some accounts of his statements and lease negotiations were admitted because they supplied context and were corroborated by contemporary records. With the inadmissible material removed, the essential facts were undisputed and the applications could be decided without a trial or cross-examination.
The wording gave Ruth only the benefits William was receiving at his death. The relevant date was his death, not the earlier date of the will: had the new well been producing royalties then, she would have qualified for them. But no royalties were paid or payable from that well from the beginning of 2016 until early 2018, and there was no valid lease for it when William died.
The lapse was not merely a clerical error or a reason for precautionary paperwork. Crescent Point lacked authority to drill and operate that well, and had threatened to abandon it if negotiations failed. Earlier, brief production did not make it a producing well at William’s death.
The court also rejected reliance on presumptions favouring close relatives or avoiding irrational results. The clause was clear, and Ruth had received substantial other benefits under the will. Excluding the new royalties was not obviously unjust or absurd.
Capital belonged to the remainder beneficiaries
The new royalties did not fall into the estate’s residue simply because Ruth was not entitled to them. The court treated the oil as capital and the proceeds of its extraction as capital receipts.
The remainder beneficiaries’ interests vested when William died. Postponing their enjoyment until Ruth’s death protected her prior life interest; it did not make their entitlement conditional on a personal requirement. No part of the mineral parcel’s ownership was left undisposed of.
Bergbusch distinguished earlier mining cases in which royalties were invested and the life tenant received the investment income. Ruth’s interest was narrower: it covered only benefits William was receiving at death. Giving her the investment income from the new royalties would expand that gift. Moreover, the new lease had not been agreed to by all beneficiaries, and the well had not entered lawful production before William’s death.
Unless the executors and all remainder beneficiaries agree otherwise, the bonus, royalties and other benefits under the new lease must be invested. Both the accumulated capital and its investment income are to go to the remainder beneficiaries when Ruth’s life interest ends.
The five objecting beneficiaries could not compel immediate distribution under the rule permitting beneficiaries to terminate a trust. Ruth still held part of the beneficial interest, and the objectors represented only a minority of the remainder beneficiaries. The judge left room for an agreed alternative and for beneficiaries to forgo reimbursement of amounts Ruth had already received.
Mistakes did not warrant removal
The court separately rejected the application to replace the executors. Protecting beneficiaries is central, but not every mistake justifies overriding the deceased’s choice. The record did not establish a lack of honesty, reasonable fidelity or capacity.
Concerns about an allegedly concealed signed will lacked substance. The unsigned copy had been admitted to probate and its validity was not challenged. Delay associated with a proposed corporation was also insufficient: beneficiaries did not have to accept shares instead of their bequests, but the proposal was well-intentioned, a resolution had been reached, and the executors had provided accounts and interim distributions.
The executors did breach the statutory requirement to obtain a court order or all interested beneficiaries’ consent before entering the new lease. Whether particular consents were informed was left undecided. Still, nobody sought to set the lease aside as improvident; its terms improved on earlier offers, and the executors had relied on professional advice.
The complaint about depletion of the mineral resource was, in substance, a dispute over who received the royalties. The judge did not consider the objectors opposed to extraction itself.
On Ruth’s personal interest in the payments, the executors reasonably relied on legal advice that proved wrong. They nevertheless should have held the money in trust once the interpretation was clearly disputed. Seeking the court’s directions showed an intention to discharge their duties, and there was no reason to expect non-compliance with the ruling.
Bergbusch remained available to give implementation directions on 14 days’ notice. Costs were left for agreement or a further conference. The decision does not establish that the disputed funds have since been repaid or distributed.
Source: Krell Estate v. Knoch, 2026 SKKB 51.



