Living next door to a proposed development did not, by itself, give a Charlottetown resident standing to challenge a site-preparation permit. The Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission dismissed her appeal after finding that her sincerely held concerns lacked an adequate objective basis in Louise Aalders v. City of Charlottetown, 2026 PEIRAC 7, issued February 13, 2026.
The ruling concerns a permit for site mobilization and construction hoarding at a proposed apartment-building site on Haviland Street. It does not decide the merits of an eventual apartment-building permit or find that the property is free of contamination.
A narrower right of appeal
Louise Aalders filed her appeal in August 2025, while also seeking reconsideration from the city. The commission agreed to put the appeal on hold during reconsideration. It resumed after she advised in September that the city process had ended.
Pan American Properties, the developer, then challenged her standing. The commission invited written submissions from all parties and decided that the comprehensive submissions allowed it to determine the preliminary question without an oral hearing. Charlottetown took no position on that question.
The commission explained that amendments adopted in November 2023 narrowed the Planning Act’s appeal threshold. The former right for a dissatisfied person to appeal was replaced by a requirement to qualify as an aggrieved person under the statutory definition.
The relevant provision covers an individual who believes in good faith that the decision will adversely affect the reasonable enjoyment of property the individual owns or occupies. When standing is challenged, the appellant must establish that status on a balance of probabilities. The commission stressed that this preliminary inquiry must not be confused with deciding whether the appeal itself should succeed.
Sincerity was accepted, but evidence was insufficient
Aalders raised concerns about possible site contamination, the location and protection of a buffer zone, effects on the nearby boardwalk and environment, and the eventual building’s setbacks and shadows. She also questioned the city’s compliance with its planning rules and the fairness of the permit process.
The developer argued that those concerns were speculative or generalized, rather than showing how this particular permit would affect her enjoyment of neighbouring property. The commission accepted that the claimed adverse effects had to arise from the decision actually under appeal, not simply from the developer’s eventual goal.
That distinction excluded concerns directed mainly at the future apartment building, such as its setbacks and shadow effects, from the present standing analysis. The commission expressly left open whether those concerns might support standing at a later stage in the development process.
The commission accepted both Aalders’ proximity to the site and the sincerity of her beliefs. Drawing on its earlier decisions and persuasive Nova Scotia planning precedent, however, it held that good faith also requires a reasonable, objective basis for believing that the specific decision will adversely affect the person’s property enjoyment.
On contamination, the commission found that Aalders had not supplied objective evidence establishing that the site was contaminated and that disturbing it would harm her. The absence of documents ruling out contamination was not enough to establish standing. The commission noted the city’s position that environmental, health and safety concerns would be considered at the next permitting stage, without deciding those future issues itself.
It also found that she had not explained how the authorized site preparation would affect the buffer zone or her enjoyment of it. A separate provincial permit involving removal and replacement of the boardwalk fell outside this appeal. Broader complaints about the city’s diligence and compliance with planning documents concerned the merits, rather than establishing the required personal adverse effect.
Dismissal was limited to this appeal
The commission acknowledged that proximity will often weigh heavily in favour of standing. Its conclusion was not that neighbours can never appeal, but that a neighbour must still meet the statutory test in relation to the particular decision challenged.
Because Aalders did not meet that threshold, the commission found it lacked jurisdiction to hear her appeal and dismissed it in Order LA26-01. The decision did not uphold the permit after a full hearing on its merits, authorize the apartment building as a whole or determine what has since been built.
