Sobeys ordered to compensate pharmacy manager after disability-related demotion

Sobeys must pay a former pharmacy manager $78,354.12 in lost wages and $50,000 for injury to her dignity after the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal found that her disability played a part in a decision to eliminate her management role and demote her. The tribunal also ordered $15,000 in costs for improper conduct involving late disclosure of important documents.

In Neske v. Sobeys Inc. (No. 2), 2026 BCHRT 37, tribunal member Shannon Beckett found that Sobeys had not justified requiring Neske to work full-time hours to retain a managerial role. The February 3, 2026 decision upheld her physical-disability complaint but rejected her separate allegation of age discrimination.

The ruling concerned the company’s Central Fill facility in Surrey, which prepared prescriptions for other pharmacies rather than serving the public directly. Neske had worked for Safeway and then Sobeys for almost 30 years. She helped develop its compounding operation, where ingredients were combined to make prescriptions not commercially available, and became its compounding pharmacy manager.

Restructuring did not explain the full decision

After spinal surgeries, Neske returned to work in January 2018 under a gradual return-to-work plan. By March 2019, her medically recommended schedule was 24 hours a week. Sobeys had been considering a structure with one overall pharmacy manager and two assistant managers, including Neske overseeing compounding at her existing pay.

Internal correspondence connected that proposed management role to whether Neske could maintain full-time status. In September 2019, Sobeys instead told her that her position was being eliminated and offered her a staff pharmacist role, with a later pay reduction and possible loss of full-time status and benefits.

Sobeys denied discrimination. It said the changes reflected legitimate business restructuring, that it valued Neske’s experience and wanted to retain her, and that she frustrated accommodation by refusing to engage with a reasonable alternative job. Beckett acknowledged the restructuring evidence and the company’s history of accommodating her, but found that neither answered why disability-related limits on her hours prevented her from remaining in management.

The tribunal accepted that ensuring proper departmental oversight was rationally connected to a managerial role. But Sobeys had not supplied sufficient evidence about adopting its full-time standard in a good-faith belief that it was necessary. Beckett expressly noted that there was no evidence suggesting anything other than good faith; the finding was that the company had not met its burden of proof.

More fundamentally, Sobeys had not shown why it could not accommodate Neske in a managerial position on reduced hours without undue hardship. A September 2018 performance assessment, completed while she was working reduced hours, rated her as exceeding expectations. The tribunal found that the company assumed management required full-time hours without properly investigating whether she could continue meeting the role’s responsibilities.

Offering the staff pharmacist position did not cure that problem. The tribunal found that the job involved physical demands different from the largely administrative management role. Sobeys knew of restrictions affecting Neske’s ability to do the work and later received a medical note saying she could not cope with the staff pharmacist duties, yet did not meaningfully investigate possible accommodation. Beckett rejected the argument that Neske had frustrated the process.

Compensation had limits

Neske’s age-discrimination allegation did not succeed. Evidence that other older employees had been replaced by younger people did not establish a sufficient connection between her age and the decision affecting her. The tribunal found that those observations concerned circumstances different from her own.

The tribunal accepted that the discriminatory conduct was a major contributing factor to a deterioration in Neske’s health that left her unable to work. It did not accept that she had proved the necessary connection for her entire claimed period, from her final pay to the May 2025 hearing. She had sought $430,947.59 in lost wages.

Instead, Beckett attributed 12 months of inability to work to the discrimination and used monthly earnings of $6,529.51 to award $78,354.12. The tribunal also rejected claimed expenses for replacement extended-health coverage in later years because the required causal connection had not been proved. These findings did not mean Neske was medically able to work throughout those later years; they concerned what losses were attributable to Sobeys’ conduct.

The separate $50,000 dignity award reflected the profound effect on a long career and professional identity, Neske’s vulnerability and the manner in which the demotion was communicated. The tribunal described dignity compensation as compensatory, rather than a punishment for the employer.

Late documents warranted a separate costs award

The disclosure issue concerned internal correspondence about the planned management structure, including an email linking retention in management to full-time hours. Some documents were not disclosed until the weeks before the hearing, roughly four years after an earlier disclosure. They had been missing when Neske opposed Sobeys’ application to dismiss the complaint before a hearing.

Sobeys argued that additional searches followed the tribunal’s identification of missing information and that Neske had not suffered prejudice. Beckett rejected its explanation for failing to locate and disclose documents central to the dispute. The finding was that Sobeys either intentionally withheld key documents or was careless in its search—not a definitive finding of intentional concealment.

Either possibility, the tribunal concluded, breached its disclosure rule and harmed the fairness and integrity of the complaint process. Beckett emphasized employees’ dependence on employers for relevant records and the risk that a complaint could be dismissed without important evidence. She fixed costs at $15,000 to punish and deter the improper conduct, rather than leaving the parties to negotiate an unspecified legal-fee amount.

The final order declared the discrimination, required Sobeys to cease the contravention and refrain from the same or similar conduct, and imposed the compensation and costs awards. It also awarded interest on the wage compensation and post-judgment interest on the dignity award. The reasons do not establish that the ordered amounts have since been paid.

Source: Neske v. Sobeys Inc. (No. 2), 2026 BCHRT 37, February 3, 2026.