A landlord and two people who acted as her agents were ordered to pay a former tenant more than $100,000 after the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal found that they denied disability-related accommodations and retaliated against her for pursuing a human rights complaint.

In Lloyd v. Fernanda Almeida and others (No. 2), 2026 BCHRT 12, issued January 8, 2026, tribunal member Laila Said Alam found that Catherine Lloyd experienced nearly two years of escalating mistreatment rather than the practical accommodations she needed to use her home.

The decision orders property owner Fernanda Almeida and her agents, Diana Rosso and Wayne Rosso, to pay $30,596.17 for expenses, $60,000 for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect, and $10,000 in costs. All three respondents are jointly and severally liable for the orders.

Access to everyday amenities curtailed

Lloyd, a senior with arthritis and mobility-related disabilities, began renting the basement suite in 2014. For the first four years, she had arrangements with the upstairs tenant that allowed her to park near the house, store her mobility scooter in the garage, use the shared laundry and keep a chair outside where she could rest.

The Rossos moved into the upstairs suite at the end of 2018. The tribunal found that restrictions on those arrangements created disability-related barriers, including painful trips between Lloyd's car and her suite and difficulty doing laundry when her symptoms allowed it.

The respondents also required Lloyd to move belongings from shared storage into her apartment. The tribunal found that they then relied on the resulting clutter to support eviction attempts. It accepted that their demands failed to account for her physical limitations and that harassment of visitors and support workers increased her isolation.

Lloyd moved out on November 30, 2020.

The respondents denied discrimination and retaliation. They said their actions were justified by their family's need for the property and concerns about safety, damage and the condition of the suite. Alam rejected those explanations, relying on documents and testimony she found credible. She found Wayne Rosso's evidence evasive and misleading where it conflicted with that record.

Human rights protection extended beyond the suite

The respondents argued that the tribunal's jurisdiction stopped at the interior of Lloyd's apartment. Alam rejected that position: parking, laundry, storage and common areas could form part of the terms or conditions of a tenancy protected by the Human Rights Code.

The Rossos' position as upstairs tenants did not put their conduct beyond scrutiny. They also acted for Almeida and had the power to affect Lloyd's living conditions, including access to amenities and dealings with tenancy authorities.

Several disputes had already gone before the Residential Tenancy Branch. Alam accepted relevant factual findings from those proceedings rather than allowing the parties to litigate the same facts again. But she emphasized that the human rights complaint involved a distinct legal framework.

Lloyd had to establish that she had a disability, experienced an adverse impact in her tenancy and that her disability was a factor in that impact. Once she did so, the respondents had to justify their conduct, including showing that reasonable accommodation was not possible without undue hardship. Alam found they had not established hardship, let alone undue hardship.

That distinction mattered where earlier tenancy rulings had not guaranteed Lloyd particular parking or storage arrangements. The tribunal still had to consider whether disability accommodation required more. It found that the respondents had not demonstrated undue hardship or reasonably explored practical alternatives.

Alam did not say that every request to remove belongings from common space is discriminatory. Her findings concerned the manner and extent of the demands in this case, the respondents' knowledge of Lloyd's disabilities and their failure to accommodate her needs.

Retaliation found, but not every allegation succeeded

The tribunal found that the respondents knew by October 4, 2019, that Lloyd might file a human rights complaint. It did not accept her argument that their awareness had been established earlier.

After that point, Alam found retaliatory conduct that included threats, the use of cameras and speakers to intimidate Lloyd and visitors, termination of laundry access, shutting off gas heat, failure to address recommended mold remediation and further eviction attempts.

The respondents maintained that their conduct was unrelated to the complaint. Alam found that the escalation and the evidence connecting particular actions to the complaint defeated that explanation.

One allegation failed. The tribunal was not persuaded that listing the property for sale during the pandemic was retaliation. It distinguished a proposed sale, with significant consequences for the respondents themselves, from the other conduct and found the intention was to end the relationship with Lloyd rather than respond to her complaint.

Compensation and a separate costs order

The expense award covered scooter assessment and replacement, storage, moving-related expenses, move-in assistance and the difference between Lloyd's former and new rent through the hearing period. Alam accepted that she would not have incurred those expenses but for the discrimination. The respondents had not challenged their amounts or reasonableness or argued that she should have reduced her losses.

In awarding $60,000 for injury to dignity, Alam considered the prolonged and escalating conduct, Lloyd's vulnerability and the specific effects on her. The tribunal found that many accommodations could have been simple and inexpensive, yet the respondents had not meaningfully explored them.

Alam contrasted the case with an earlier tenancy decision awarding $35,000, in which landlords had offered alternatives that proved inadequate. Here, she found discrimination on multiple fronts and no meaningful effort to explore accommodations. She also considered the upward trend in tribunal awards and inflation when determining an amount to compensate Lloyd's injury.

The separate $10,000 costs award addressed improper conduct during the proceedings. The reasons focus on Wayne Rosso's repeated disregard of directions, unsupported personal attacks, disruption of the hearing and false testimony. Alam did not accept every procedural criticism: she was not satisfied that his disorganized presentation of documents had unduly lengthened the hearing.

The final orders direct the respondents to stop the contraventions and refrain from similar conduct. They required payment of the dignity award within three months of the decision and ordered post-judgment interest on the amounts awarded until paid in full. The $100,596.17 total combines compensation and costs; it does not include that interest.