Quebec’s refusal to genuinely negotiate funding renewals for an Indigenous police force breached both contractual good faith and the honour of the Crown, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled, upholding an award of $767,745.58 plus interest and an additional indemnity.

In Quebec (Attorney General) v. Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan, 2024 SCC 39, decided November 27, 2024, an eight-judge majority dismissed Quebec’s appeal. Justice Nicholas Kasirer distinguished the duty governing every contract from the higher public-law standard applicable to these agreements with the band council representing the Pekuakamiulnuatsh First Nation.

The distinction determined the remedy. The record could not establish ordinary contractual damages, but the majority upheld the award as a means of repairing the Crown’s relationship with the community. Justice Suzanne Côté dissented, finding Quebec had fulfilled its undertakings and warning against overriding express funding limits.

A police force caught between funding limits and community needs

Canada, Quebec and the council had entered successive agreements since 1996 for the Sécurité publique de Mashteuiatsh, which provides culturally appropriate policing in Mashteuiatsh, near Roberval. The council managed the force. The governments contributed capped amounts, divided 52 per cent federally and 48 per cent provincially, while the council accepted responsibility for deficits.

The dispute concerned agreements covering 2013 to 2017, when deficits totalled about $1.6 million. A 2014 arbitration award granting police officers $853,000 in retroactive pay accounted for much of the largest annual shortfall. The majority emphasized that the deficits were not attributed to mismanagement.

The trial judge dismissed the council’s claim. Quebec’s Court of Appeal reversed that result and ordered the governments to cover their respective shares of the accumulated deficits. Canada paid the award against it and did not appeal, the Supreme Court’s reasons recorded. Quebec challenged its own liability and the amount awarded.

The Supreme Court accepted two important limits on the council’s argument: Quebec had never promised to cover every policing expense, and the federal First Nations Policing Policy did not itself bind the province. An inadequate funding offer, by itself, therefore did not establish breach of contract.

Renewal negotiations carried their own obligation

The contractual problem arose from how Quebec exercised its rights when the agreements were renewed.

Although generally annual during the disputed period, the agreements contemplated an ongoing relationship. An extension clause allowed their provisions to continue while a new agreement was negotiated, but excluded the funding provisions from that continuation. Funding was therefore to be reassessed through negotiation when the parties chose to continue their relationship.

Quebec could end the arrangement, subject to good faith. It did not have to accept a particular funding demand. Once it sought renewal, however, it had to consider the council’s interests and negotiate genuinely, rather than insist on non-negotiable terms despite knowing the force was underfunded.

The trial judge had treated the absence of bad faith as sufficient. Kasirer said good faith also imposes an objective standard: conduct can be excessive or unreasonable even without dishonesty. The judge had also overlooked the renewal mechanism, which was essential to assessing the alleged breach.

The majority found Quebec knew the funding did not match actual costs and that the council faced an unacceptable choice: absorb further deficits to preserve its own force, or return to Sûreté du Québec services that were poorly adapted to the community. Evidence about mistrust and historical harm associated with imposed policing was relevant context.

Quebec’s inflexibility abused its right to renew. Kasirer added that, having refused genuine negotiation, the province could not insist on strict enforcement of the funding cap and deficit clauses as though the renewed terms were unrelated to its own abusive conduct. Occasional additional assistance did not cure that failure in the renewal process.

When a contract engages the honour of the Crown

The majority also found an independent public-law basis for liability. The honour of the Crown did not apply merely because an Indigenous entity was a contracting party: ordinary commercial agreements would not necessarily engage it.

For the circumstances before the Court, Kasirer identified agreements made on the basis of a group’s Indigenous difference and relating to an established right, or a credible claim, to self-government. The contract must have a collective dimension. He left open whether other Indigenous rights or interests might engage the principle in different contractual settings.

These agreements qualified. They supported culturally appropriate policing managed by the community, addressing the historical harm associated with externally imposed police services. A separate agreement in principle and Quebec’s legislative history supported the credibility of the community’s self-government claim in public safety.

The Court did not decide that a constitutional right to self-government had been established. Nor did it convert the policing agreements into treaties. Clauses disclaiming recognition of Aboriginal or treaty rights did not prevent the honour of the Crown from governing how these undertakings were performed.

Unlike contractual good faith, the majority treated this obligation as a distinct public-law duty, rather than an implied contract term. Quebec had to act with honour and integrity, avoid sharp dealing and approach negotiations with an open mind. Its refusal to genuinely renegotiate funding also breached that higher standard. The Court did not need to decide whether fiduciary duties or a separate duty of diligent performance also arose.

Why the award survived without a new damages hearing

Ordinary contractual damages would compensate for injury caused by the breach. The majority could not assume that proper negotiations would have produced full government funding or eliminated every deficit. Additional payments might also affect the calculation. On that basis alone, the case would have returned to the trial court.

The honour-of-the-Crown remedy served a different purpose: restoring a relationship damaged financially, in the quality of policing and in the community’s dignity. The majority described this as reconciliatory justice, requiring attention to the Indigenous perspective and the relationship’s future.

Damages were available without first trying a declaration. No single remedy had priority. In this case, the majority held that Quebec’s supplementary assistance had kept the force operating without repairing the underlying harm. Requiring another hearing after years of litigation would add disproportionate delay and expense without a clear prospect of a different amount.

The award therefore remained intact. The majority stressed that it was not rewriting the agreements to promise full funding. It also cautioned that concurrent private- and public-law remedies must account for one another to avoid double compensation.

Côté would have enforced the agreed limits

Côté agreed the honour of the Crown applied, but viewed it as an implied contractual obligation that could not contradict express terms. She found Quebec’s conduct honourable and consistent with good faith: it listened to the council and provided additional money, personnel and other assistance despite budget constraints.

She emphasized the council’s contractual and financial autonomy and the trial judge’s findings that it knowingly chose to maintain services beyond what the government contributions covered. In her view, requiring Quebec to cover its share of all deficits effectively rewrote the bargain and intruded on government spending choices.

Côté also rejected the need for a separate remedial framework. Ordinary civil-law compensation could accommodate Indigenous perspectives and reconciliation. Even if a breach had been established, she would have returned the damages issue to trial for assessment of causation and deductions, including supplementary payments and time-barred amounts. She would have restored the dismissal of the claim.

The majority dismissed Quebec’s appeal with ordinary costs, refusing the council’s request for solicitor-client costs. It dismissed a motion to introduce a new auditor’s report as moot. The ruling establishes liability and preserves the award; it does not establish when Quebec paid it.

Source: Supreme Court of Canada, 2024 SCC 39.