Investors in the Golden Oaks Ponzi scheme could not use its operator’s knowledge of unlawful payments to defeat the bankruptcy trustee’s recovery claims as too late, the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled.

In Scott v. Golden Oaks Enterprises Inc., 2024 SCC 32, the Court dismissed the investors’ appeal with costs on October 11, 2024. It also rejected their attempts to offset repayment obligations against lost investments, upheld the recovery of referral commissions and left intact a separate preferential-payment ruling against real estate agent Lorne Scott.

All seven judges agreed on the result. Justice Mahmud Jamal wrote for six judges. Justice Suzanne Côté reached the same conclusion through a different analysis of Ontario’s limitation rules and separately addressed how set-off operates in bankruptcy.

The ruling preserved the trustee’s recovery rights. It did not establish how much money creditors ultimately received.

A rent-to-own business that depended on new lenders

Joseph Lacasse operated Golden Oaks in Ottawa between 2009 and 2013 as its sole shareholder, officer and directing mind. He promoted a rent-to-own housing business and offered investors high-interest promissory notes to finance its operations.

The courts found that the business was a Ponzi scheme: money from new lenders paid earlier investors, rather than returns coming from legitimate business revenue. Some investors also recruited lenders in exchange for commissions of eight per cent of the amount invested.

Golden Oaks issued 504 promissory notes to 153 investors. Rates eventually exceeded the criminal-interest threshold applicable at the time, and nearly two-thirds of the notes carried criminal rates. Lacasse personally took approximately $1.3 million in profits.

The scheme collapsed in July 2013. Golden Oaks and Lacasse entered receivership and bankruptcy, with Doyle Salewski Inc. administering their estates. In 2015, the trustee brought numerous proceedings, including 17 consolidated actions seeking repayment of unlawful interest and commissions.

The appellant investors had themselves lost invested principal. Their position was that the trustee’s claims were late, their losses should offset repayment obligations, and the referral agreements justified keeping their commissions.

Why the limitation defence failed

Ontario generally requires a claim to be brought within two years after it is discovered. The investors argued that Lacasse knew about the payments when they occurred, more than two years before the trustee sued. If his knowledge belonged to Golden Oaks, the trustee, as the company’s successor, would inherit it and face an expired deadline.

The majority accepted that the trustee inherited Golden Oaks’ knowledge under section 12(1) of the Limitations Act, 2002. The disputed step was whether Lacasse’s knowledge had to be treated as the company’s.

The majority rejected reliance on the Act’s separate principal-and-agent rule. Section 12(2) addressed proceedings commenced by a principal, whereas these proceedings were commenced by the trustee, which was not Lacasse’s principal. The trial findings were also insufficient to decide the investors’ separate common-law agency argument for the first time on appeal.

The Court therefore applied corporate attribution—the rules determining when a person’s conduct or knowledge counts as that of a corporation. Drawing on its companion decision in Aquino v. Bondfield Construction Co., 2024 SCC 31, the majority stressed that attribution depends on the purpose of the law being applied.

A company with one owner and directing mind is still legally separate from that person. There was no automatic rule requiring Lacasse’s knowledge to be attributed to Golden Oaks simply because he controlled it alone.

The usual conditions for attribution were initially satisfied, and some scheme proceeds had benefited the company by paying operating and property expenses. Nevertheless, the Court could decline attribution when it would defeat the relevant legislation’s purposes.

Here, Lacasse had no incentive to sue the investors on Golden Oaks’ behalf: doing so would expose the scheme from which he profited. Treating his knowledge as the company’s would bar claims before the trustee could realistically pursue them. It would also let investors retain unlawful payments and reduce the estate available to other creditors.

The majority consequently upheld the refusal to attribute his knowledge to Golden Oaks. It did not need to decide the trial judge’s alternative reasoning about when proceedings became legally appropriate.

Côté reached the same result through the statute

Côté considered the statutory attribution rules sufficient. In her view, the findings about Lacasse’s complete control established that he was Golden Oaks’ agent, so the company knew about the payments through him. The common-law corporate-attribution doctrine should not displace the legislature’s rules.

But knowledge of a loss alone did not start the limitation period. The Act also required knowledge that a proceeding was an appropriate way to remedy it. While Lacasse alone controlled Golden Oaks, nobody else could cause it to sue and expose his scheme.

Côté emphasized that bankruptcy did not automatically restart a limitation clock. A sale of the company or appointment of other directors might also have ended the obstacle to litigation. On this record, receivership ended Lacasse’s sole control, and the supervising court’s June 2015 authorization to commence proceedings meant that even the later-filed claims were timely.

Lost principal did not excuse repayment of unlawful interest

The investors sought equitable set-off, which can allow closely connected reciprocal claims to be balanced against each other when enforcing one without the other would be unjust. They argued that their lost principal exceeded what the trustee sought to recover.

The Court rejected that defence because the investors lacked “clean hands” in the transactions. The trial judge found that they knew or should have known they were entering illegal agreements, had failed to undertake basic due diligence and had ignored warning signs. Their wrongdoing was directly connected to the payments they sought to retain.

Being victims of the scheme did not eliminate those findings. The ruling concerned equitable set-off; the trial judge’s rejection of legal set-off had not been appealed further.

The majority left open whether the effect on other creditors could independently justify denying set-off. Côté would have resolved that question: Parliament expressly permits otherwise valid set-off in bankruptcy, even when it improves one creditor’s position. She nevertheless agreed that these investors’ conduct defeated their claim.

Referral commissions and Scott’s separate liability

The referral agreements supplied no lawful justification for keeping commissions. The Court rejected the argument that common-law illegality had not been raised at trial: the trustee had pleaded and argued it, although the trial judge had addressed only the unsuccessful Securities Act argument.

An agreement may be unenforceable because it was entered into, at least partly, to accomplish an illegal act. That purpose is assessed objectively. A person’s lack of subjective awareness of the Ponzi scheme did not settle the question.

The referring investors also made unlawful loans themselves, and their agreements recruited others into those loans. The Court upheld the conclusion that the referral arrangements were tainted by illegality. It also rejected the argument that the investors were less blameworthy than Golden Oaks: attributing Lacasse’s wrongdoing to the company for that purpose would undermine the bankruptcy and illegality rules by allowing retention of the proceeds.

Scott additionally challenged a finding that he was not dealing at arm’s length with Golden Oaks, which supported recovery of preferential payments under section 95(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. The trial order required him to repay $72,575 in interest and commissions on that basis.

The Court held that the judge could examine the wider relationship when assessing the particular transactions. Scott had represented the company, helped sustain its operations and sent messages describing it as a pyramid or house of cards. The Supreme Court found no basis to disturb the findings that he knew he was helping prop up the scheme and acted in concert with Golden Oaks.

Source: Supreme Court of Canada judgment.