The Supreme Court of Canada has ordered the Crown to address nearly 150 years of broken treaty promises to the Anishinaabe of the upper Great Lakes, ruling that annuities frozen at $4 per person since 1875 required retrospective increases.

In Ontario (Attorney General) v. Restoule, 2024 SCC 27, the unanimous Court directed negotiations over compensation for past breaches of the Robinson-Superior Treaty. Failing agreement, the Crown had to determine an honourable amount within six months of the July 26, 2024 judgment, subject to possible court review and specified extensions.

The Court did not set a compensation figure or establish a fixed percentage of resource revenues owed to treaty beneficiaries. Its reasons distinguish the Crown’s continuing discretion over annuity increases from its obligation to compensate for the prolonged breach already acknowledged by Canada and Ontario.

The promise behind the $4 payments

The Robinson-Huron and Robinson-Superior Treaties were signed in 1850 after the Crown issued mining licences on unceded Anishinaabe territories and Indigenous leaders demanded an agreement. They covered more than 100,000 square kilometres, including the areas of present-day Thunder Bay, Sault Ste. Marie, Sudbury and North Bay.

In exchange for ceding their interests in the territories, the Anishinaabe received promises that included reserves, continued hunting and fishing rights, lump-sum payments and perpetual annuities. The initial annuities worked out to approximately $1.70 per person under the Huron treaty and $1.60 under the Superior treaty.

An augmentation clause promised increases when revenues from the ceded territory allowed the Crown to provide them without incurring loss. It referred to a limit of £1, approximately $4, per person, or a further amount the Crown might order. The only increase occurred in 1875.

Justice Mahmud Jamal, writing for all nine judges, placed the promise within an ongoing relationship grounded in respect, responsibility, reciprocity and renewal. The treaties were not simply transactions exchanging money for land. Their changing annuities were intended to help sustain a relationship as circumstances evolved.

One annuity and a constrained discretion

The litigation required the Court to decide what the augmentation clause actually promised. The trial judge had interpreted each treaty as providing a collective annuity that had to increase when economic conditions permitted, with a separate individual distribution subject to the $4 limit. She also described an entitlement to a fair share of net Crown resource revenues. The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the fair-share formulation but divided over other aspects of interpretation.

The Supreme Court rejected the two-part annuity. It found one annuity payable to the chiefs and their communities. The reference to individual payments conditioned increases to that annuity; it did not create a second payment obligation alongside an uncapped collective entitlement.

The treaty language and historical record supported that conclusion. No contemporaneous evidence established an intention to divide payments into collective and individual components. Nor had the two components ever been paid simultaneously. An unlimited mandatory collective payment would also have been difficult to reconcile with the Crown’s financial circumstances and negotiating instructions in 1850.

The $4 figure was a “soft cap.” Increases up to it were mandatory when the economic condition was met. Beyond it, the Crown retained discretion to decide whether to increase the annuity and by how much, with no ceiling on what it could provide.

That discretion was not a licence to do nothing. The Crown must periodically consider whether increases can be made without loss. Where that condition is met, it must exercise its discretion diligently, honourably, liberally and justly. Courts can review the decision, including how often the Crown considers an increase.

The Court accepted a general promise to share in the territory’s future wealth, but rejected a legally prescribed “fair share” of revenues. That formulation was unsupported by the treaty text and historical evidence and risked substituting a percentage calculation for the treaty relationship the parties intended.

Historic treaties require a correct interpretation

The decision also settled the standard appellate courts should apply when reviewing interpretations of historic treaties. The ultimate legal interpretation must be correct, rather than merely a conclusion to which an appeal court defers.

The Court emphasized that treaty rights have constitutional status, engage the honour of the Crown and bind generations beyond the immediate litigants. Those features require consistent legal interpretation. Historic treaties cannot be treated like ordinary private contracts.

Trial judges’ underlying factual findings, including historical findings and assessments of witnesses, nevertheless retain protection from appellate interference absent a palpable and overriding error. Treaty language must be considered alongside its historical and cultural setting, with sensitivity to linguistic differences and the parties’ common intentions.

Why the claims survived, without fiduciary duties

Ontario argued that six-year limitation periods under its former Limitations Act barred the claims. The Court rejected both routes advanced by the province.

The treaty claims were not “actions on the case,” an old category generally associated with tort and sometimes contract claims. The legislation contained a closed list of causes of action, not a general catch-all. Constitutional treaty claims concerned public rights and could not simply be placed within that private-law category.

They were also not “actions of account.” The Crown was not holding the ceded territories in trust or obliged to account to beneficiaries for their proceeds under the annuity promise. The ruling concerned Ontario’s applicable legislation; it did not declare every Indigenous claim immune from limitation periods.

The First Nations’ cross-appeals seeking specific fiduciary duties failed. There was no undertaking that the Crown would act with exclusive loyalty to the beneficiaries when deciding annuity increases, as a private-law fiduciary duty would require. The treaty contemplated consideration of wider public interests too.

Nor did a distinct fiduciary duty arising from the Crown-Indigenous relationship apply. The annuity right arose from the treaty-making function itself, rather than an independently existing interest grounding that duty. Even assuming the asserted pre-existing land interest qualified, there was no undertaking that the Crown would administer the ceded land on the beneficiaries’ behalf.

Those conclusions did not relieve the Crown of responsibility. The honour of the Crown required diligent implementation of the treaty promise. Its prolonged failure was a breach of the treaties themselves, supporting meaningful remedies. Merely considering increases after generations of inaction would not repair that breach.

Negotiation backed by judicial review

The Court declared the Crown’s obligations and its dishonourable breach, but held that a declaration alone was insufficient. It directed meaningful negotiations with the Superior plaintiffs, followed, if necessary, by the Crown’s own compensation determination within the six-month window.

The Court favoured that sequence because the promise involved discretion and an ongoing relationship. Compensation required consideration of the beneficiaries’ needs, the Crown’s benefits and expenses, the severity of its breach and broader public needs. It rejected proceeding immediately to an unrestricted judicial damages calculation, while preserving judicial accountability.

The Superior plaintiffs could seek review of both the process and the amount. An honourable decision would attract deference. If the process or determination was dishonourable, a court could order reconsideration or itself set compensation. Payment of the Crown-determined amount was not to be stayed merely because review might follow, and was to occur within a reasonable time allowing necessary legislative approvals.

The Court continued the stay of the litigation’s compensation stage for six months. The Superior plaintiffs could seek additional time for settlement; the Crown could not obtain an extension over their opposition. Ontario’s appeals were allowed in part, the cross-appeals dismissed, and the plaintiffs were awarded solicitor-client costs of both.

The Huron plaintiffs had already reached a separate $10-billion settlement for past breaches, approved in February 2024 and unaffected by the Supreme Court appeal. That settlement was not an amount awarded by this judgment and did not resolve future annuity obligations.

Subsequent compensation decision

The Superior negotiations did not produce a settlement. On January 27, 2025, Canada and Ontario determined compensation at $3.6 billion, with equal contributions. In Red Rock First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONSC 1169, released February 27, 2026, Justice Hennessy declined to disturb that amount, finding it within the range of honourable results.

That was not an endorsement of every aspect of the Crown’s conduct. Hennessy criticized negotiating mandates, a lack of transparency about comparisons with the Huron settlement, and Ontario’s treatment of expenses. Canada’s justification nevertheless supported the overall determination. The ruling also left contingent shares for six First Nations subject to further court orders and legal costs subject to assessment or agreement.

A federal briefing document for a June 11, 2026 parliamentary appearance reported that the First Nations had filed a notice of appeal and Ontario a notice of cross-appeal. The compensation review should therefore not be read as an unqualified final resolution of the litigation or the treaties’ continuing obligations.

Source: Ontario (Attorney General) v. Restoule, 2024 SCC 27.