The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that compensation for the City of St. John’s constructive expropriation of the Lynch family’s land must reflect its existing watershed zoning, rather than assume the property could be developed for housing.

In St. John’s (City) v. Lynch, 2024 SCC 17, released May 10, 2024, the unanimous court restored a lower-court order requiring the valuation to account for the zoning’s discretionary agriculture, forestry and public utility uses. Justice Sheilah Martin wrote the reasons.

The family’s entitlement to compensation had already been established in separate litigation. The Supreme Court was deciding how to value the land, and did not set a final dollar award.

The decision explains when land-use restrictions must be disregarded in calculating expropriation compensation: the key is whether they were adopted with a view to expropriation, rather than independently to regulate land use.

A watershed property with sharply different valuations

The family’s 7.36-acre property lies within the Broad Cove River watershed, a source of drinking water for St. John’s. Their grandfather received a Crown grant in 1917 for harvesting trees for barrels and firewood. A house was later removed, and the property remained covered in trees and shrubs.

The land became subject to the city’s pollution-control and expropriation powers in 1959. Restrictions on building followed. After a 1992 municipal reorganization brought the property inside city boundaries, the city adopted development regulations in 1994 designating it as Watershed.

That zoning contained no permitted uses. Agriculture, forestry and public utility uses were discretionary: they required the city’s approval. A later watershed management plan recommended continued restrictions on development and identified a long-term goal of restoring natural, pristine conditions where opportunities and funding allowed.

The family pursued various development possibilities. In 2011, the city rejected inquiries concerning residential development, tree harvesting, farming, sawmilling, and wind or solar power, maintaining that the land should remain unused in its natural state. It formally refused a proposed 10-lot residential subdivision on February 1, 2013.

In 2016, the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal held that the city had constructively expropriated the property. It had acquired the beneficial interest of a continuous supply of uncontaminated groundwater while eliminating all reasonable uses of the land. That conclusion was not before the Supreme Court in this appeal.

The competing appraisals illustrated the stakes. The city obtained a $105,000 valuation based on acceptable agriculture or forestry uses and a separate $670,000 valuation assuming medium-density residential development. The family’s appraiser valued the property at $875,000 assuming residential approval. These were appraisals, not compensation awards.

The Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities, responsible for determining compensation if the parties could not agree, referred the zoning question to a judge. The application judge held that the zoning must be considered. The provincial Court of Appeal disagreed, treating it as part of the expropriation process that should be excluded from the valuation.

Removing the effects of the taking

Expropriation compensation generally aims to put owners in the same economic position they would have occupied without the taking. Market value is the starting point, and legally available development potential can matter. The owner is not entitled to a speculative windfall based on uses the land could not otherwise support.

A related rule, known as the Pointe Gourde principle, removes increases or decreases in value caused by the expropriation scheme itself. Newfoundland and Labrador’s Expropriation Act reflects that principle by requiring compensation to be assessed without regard to the compulsory acquisition.

A municipality therefore cannot depress a property’s value by downzoning or freezing development in anticipation of acquiring it, then rely on the reduced value to pay less. But ordinary zoning restrictions adopted independently of an expropriation remain relevant, even when they reduce the land’s value.

Martin rejected the causal approaches advanced by both sides. The family’s approach was too broad: a regulation could form a necessary link in the events leading to a taking without having been enacted to facilitate it. Conversely, the city’s focus on the final decision that eliminated all development was too narrow. Looking only at that last step could leave earlier, deliberate value-reducing measures in place.

The proper inquiry considers the regulation’s purpose and effects and asks whether it was made with a view to expropriation. A citywide or provincewide policy, a measure that does not target particular properties, or action by a different public authority may indicate independence. None supplies an automatic answer.

Nor must owners prove bad faith. A development freeze adopted in anticipation of a public project may serve legitimate public interests and still have to be excluded when compensation is calculated.

Why the zoning remained part of the valuation

The application judge had found that the 1994 Watershed zoning arose from an independent citywide planning process following municipal reorganization. It left three possible discretionary uses. In her assessment, the taking resulted from the city’s policy of keeping the property entirely unused, including its refusal to exercise discretion to allow development consistent with those uses.

The Supreme Court held that this factual assessment deserved appellate deference unless an identifiable legal error or a palpable and overriding factual error justified intervention. The Court of Appeal’s reliance on connections among the zoning, statutory controls and watershed policy did not establish such an error.

Martin acknowledged that the record could support different interpretations of the city’s intentions. But the policy document relied on by the Court of Appeal was received in 1996, after the planning process that produced the 1994 regulations. The application judge’s assessment could stand; the Supreme Court did not impose a universal rule that environmental zoning must always be included in a valuation.

Ignoring the zoning here would compensate the family for something they would not have had without the expropriation: unrestricted land for residential development. The court restored the order requiring compensation to account for the Watershed zoning and its discretionary uses, and directed each party to bear its own costs in the Supreme Court and the courts below.

Source: Supreme Court of Canada, St. John’s (City) v. Lynch, 2024 SCC 17.