The Supreme Court of Canada has ordered a new trial for a Quebec man originally acquitted of sexual assault, ruling that the trial judge failed to properly consider circumstantial evidence regarding the complainant’s capacity to consent1. In a decision released on November 7, 2025, the nation’s highest court addressed the complex legal challenges that arise when a complainant has little or no memory of the alleged events due to intoxication. The split 5-4 decision in R. v. Rioux reinforces the legal principle that a lack of memory on the part of a complainant does not mean a court must rely solely on the accused’s version of events. The ruling underscores the obligation of trial judges to weigh all available evidence, including the physical and emotional state of a complainant before and after an alleged offence, when determining guilt or innocence.
The case stems from events that took place in August 2019 between Frédéric Rioux and a woman he had met online earlier that year. The two had briefly dated and decided to remain friends. On the evening of August 1, they met for a picnic at a park bordering Lake Memphrémagog in Magog, Quebec. They arrived in separate vehicles, with the plan being that the complainant would bring wine and Rioux would bring food. During the course of the evening, which lasted from approximately 5:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., alcohol was consumed. The appellant, Rioux, had brought a bottle of gin in addition to the wine provided by the complainant. The complainant testified that after consuming a mixed gin drink prepared by Rioux, her memory became fragmented. She described her state as a blackout, retaining only flashes of memory and physical sensations until she woke up the following morning in Rioux’s bed.
The timeline of events was central to the legal dispute. According to testimony, sexual acts occurred at two distinct times and locations. The first series of acts took place in the park on a picnic table between 7:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. Rioux testified that the complainant was a willing and active participant who initiated some of the contact. The complainant, conversely, testified that she had no memory of these specific acts but recalled feeling physically incapacitated, describing herself as being like a limp rag and unable to stand. Later in the evening, Rioux drove the complainant to his home in Bonsecours, where a second series of sexual acts occurred. The complainant testified that she woke up the next morning in a panic, believing she may have been drugged, a claim Rioux denied.
At the original trial in the Court of Québec, the presiding judge acquitted Rioux. The trial judge analyzed the events in the park and the events at the home separately. Regarding the sexual activity in the park, the judge concluded that because the complainant had no memory of the specific acts, he was left with only the accused’s testimony. Rioux testified that she was consenting and capable of consenting. The trial judge found this testimony probative and uncontradicted by the complainant due to her amnesia. Consequently, he ruled that the Crown had not proven the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt. regarding the later events at the home, the trial judge found that the complainant indeed lacked the capacity to consent due to her level of intoxication. However, he acquitted Rioux on that count as well, accepting that the accused had an “honest but mistaken belief” that she was consenting.
The Crown appealed the acquittal, and the Quebec Court of Appeal overturned the verdict, ordering a new trial. The appellate court found that the trial judge committed errors of law by treating the accused’s testimony as the only relevant evidence for the park incident and by ignoring significant circumstantial evidence. Rioux then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing that the appellate court had improperly interfered with the trial judge’s findings of fact and credibility assessments.
Justice Sheilah Martin, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, dismissed Rioux’s appeal and affirmed the order for a new trial regarding the events in the park. The majority held that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the totality of the evidence when determining whether the complainant consented or had the capacity to consent. Justice Martin explained that while a complainant who experiences a blackout cannot provide direct evidence of their state of mind at the exact moment of the sexual activity, they can provide crucial circumstantial evidence. This evidence can include their emotional state, physical condition, and behavior before and after the alleged assault.
The majority opinion criticized the trial judge’s approach to the evidence as being impermissibly siloed. The Supreme Court noted that the trial judge appeared to require direct evidence from the complainant to prove incapacity. When the complainant could not provide that due to memory loss, the judge incorrectly treated the accused’s testimony as the only available evidence. Justice Martin wrote that this legal error caused the trial judge to disregard a large body of relevant circumstantial evidence. This included the complainant’s testimony that she felt her head spinning, that she lost control of her gross motor skills, and that she had to be carried to the car by the accused. The majority reasoned that if the trial judge had properly applied the law, he would have weighed the complainant’s description of her physical incapacity against the accused’s claim that she was a fully willing partner.
Furthermore, the majority pointed out a logical inconsistency in the trial judge’s findings. The trial judge had determined that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent later that night at Rioux’s home. However, the evidence suggested that the consumption of alcohol occurred earlier in the evening at the park. The majority reasoned that the finding of incapacity at the home was relevant circumstantial evidence regarding her capacity at the park a few hours earlier. By failing to consider the evidence as a whole, the trial judge missed the connection between her condition at the two different times. The majority concluded that these errors had a material bearing on the acquittal, necessitating a new trial.
The legal standard for capacity to consent was a significant focus of the decision. Citing the Criminal Code and previous precedents, the Court reiterated that for a person to have the capacity to consent, they must be capable of understanding the physical act, its sexual nature, the specific identity of their partner, and the fact that they have the choice to refuse. If the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a complainant lacked the capacity to understand any one of these elements, then no legal consent exists. The majority clarified that proof of this incapacity can come from circumstantial evidence, and a trial judge is obliged to consider all credible evidence, not just direct testimony regarding the specific moment of the act.
Chief Justice Richard Wagner, writing for the dissenting judges, disagreed with the majority’s conclusion and would have restored the acquittal. The dissenting opinion emphasized the high standard required for the Crown to appeal an acquittal, noting that such appeals are limited strictly to errors of law. The dissenting judges argued that the trial judge did not fail to consider the evidence but simply found the accused’s testimony to be credible and reliable. In their view, the trial judge was aware of the circumstantial evidence but found that it did not lead to the single conclusion that the complainant was incapacitated at the park.
The dissent warned against appellate courts dissecting trial reasons to find errors where none exist. They argued that a trial judge is presumed to know the law and is not required to list every piece of evidence considered in the written decision. Chief Justice Wagner noted that the trial judge explicitly mentioned the lack of direct evidence and the reliance on circumstantial evidence, indicating he understood the legal framework. The dissent maintained that the trial judge’s decision to acquit was based on a reasonable doubt raised by the accused’s testimony, which is a finding of fact that should be owed deference by higher courts. They cautioned that expanding the definition of legal errors to include disagreements over how evidence is weighed could undermine the finality of acquittals and the presumption of innocence.
Despite the strong dissent, the majority decision stands as the binding law. The Supreme Court’s ruling confirms that in cases involving intoxication and memory loss, the judicial inquiry into consent must be holistic. Courts cannot dismiss a complainant’s evidence merely because they cannot recall the specific sexual acts. Instead, the trier of fact must look at the entire narrative, including the complainant’s condition leading up to and following the event, to infer whether they were capable of voluntary agreement.
The remedy ordered by the Court is a new trial, though it will be limited in scope. The Crown did not appeal the findings related to the events at the home in Bonsecours, specifically the finding regarding the accused’s honest but mistaken belief in consent for that specific timeframe. Therefore, the new trial will focus exclusively on the charge of sexual assault related to the events that occurred in the park. This limitation ensures that the accused is not placed in double jeopardy for the portion of the indictment where the acquittal was not challenged by the prosecution.
This decision is expected to have a significant impact on how sexual assault trials are conducted in Canada, particularly those involving alcohol or drug-induced amnesia. It signals to prosecutors and defence counsel alike that circumstantial evidence regarding a complainant’s level of intoxication is of equal weight to direct testimony when assessing capacity. The judgment reinforces the protection of sexual autonomy within the Criminal Code, ensuring that the inability to remember an event does not automatically preclude the ability to seek justice for non-consensual sexual activity. The matter will now return to the Court of Québec for a new trial consistent with the legal principles articulated by the Supreme Court.
