The Ontario Superior Court of Justice has dismissed another legal proceeding initiated by a former lawyer, Christian Chukwuedozie Chijindu, against the Law Society of Ontario1. The decision, dated October 28, 2025, marks the latest in a long series of unsuccessful legal battles waged by Mr. Chijindu following the revocation of his law licence in 2020. Associate Justice Kamal dismissed the application using Rule 2.1.01, a specific provision in the Rules of Civil Procedure designed to summarily stop proceedings that are found to be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of the court’s process. The court concluded that this latest application was an improper attempt to relitigate issues that have already been finalized by all levels of courts in Canada.
In this specific application, Mr. Chijindu was seeking two declarations from the court. First, he sought a declaration that the Law Society of Ontario had discriminated against him based on his race as a Black person, violating section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He claimed this discrimination occurred when the LSO allegedly denied him his right to apply to a court for a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter. Second, he asked the court to declare that the 2020 revocation of his licence was null, void, and of no force or effect, arguing it was a consequence of these alleged Charter violations.
The Law Society of Ontario was the sole respondent in the application and filed the requisition to have the case dismissed. The LSO argued that this new proceeding was duplicative of Mr. Chijindu’s previous failed attempts. They characterized it as a “collateral attack” on the original 2020 revocation decision, which was already final. The LSO pointed out that this was the eighth proceeding Mr. Chijindu had initiated since his licence was revoked and the third time he had specifically sought Charter based remedies related to the LSO’s conduct. The LSO maintained that the application was a direct and improper challenge to numerous prior decisions from the Superior Court, the Divisional Court, and the Court of Appeal.
Mr. Chijindu submitted that his application was not duplicative. He argued that while his previous legal actions may have involved the same set of facts, they did not engage the exact same “cause of action” or seek the same specific remedy. He contended that his claim of a section 15(1) Charter violation based on racial discrimination had not yet been properly decided on its merits by a court. He argued that a previous dismissal by Justice Akazaki was on jurisdictional grounds only, leaving the substance of his Charter challenge unadjudicated.
The entire dispute stems from the Law Society Tribunal’s decision on May 11, 2020, to revoke Mr. Chijindu’s licence to practise law. This decision followed an earlier finding that he had engaged in professional misconduct. The Tribunal’s hearing division found that Mr. Chijindu had committed “serious professional misconduct that brought discredit upon the legal profession.” The specific findings included that he acted without integrity and without respect for the administration of justice by: charging excessive and unreasonable fees to a client; failing to comply with two separate court orders that required him to reimburse that client; failing to act honorably by rendering an even larger supplementary account that was found to be duplicative and false in an attempt to get around the court’s reimbursement order; and improperly transferring funds from his trust account.
Following the 2020 revocation, Mr. Chijindu used the standard appeal process, and his case was reviewed and upheld at every stage. The Law Society Tribunal’s Appeal Division upheld the findings of misconduct and the penalty of revocation. He then appealed that decision to the Divisional Court, which also upheld the revocation. Mr. Chijindu subsequently sought leave to appeal from both the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada. Both courts denied his requests, bringing the direct appeal route for his revocation to a definitive end.
After exhausting his direct appeals, Mr. Chijindu began initiating new, separate proceedings in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. In one application, he asked for his licence to be reinstated and made declarations of Charter violations. On July 22, 2024, Justice Akazaki dismissed that application, labeling it a “flank attack” on the concluded conduct proceedings. Mr. Chijindu appealed this dismissal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, which dismissed his appeal on February 7, 2025, agreeing it was an improper collateral attack. His application for leave to appeal that decision to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied on July 31, 2025.
Just eleven days after the Court of Appeal dismissed his first application, Mr. Chijindu filed another action on February 18, 2025. This time, he sued the LSO and two of its discipline counsel for damages, alleging malfeasance in public office. On May 1, 2025, Justice Parghi dismissed that action under the same Rule 2.1.01, finding it exhibited characteristics of vexatious litigation and was unlikely to succeed. Mr. Chijindu appealed that dismissal as well. On September 16, 2025, the Court of Appeal dismissed that appeal, stating that the “frivolous nature” of both his action and his appeal was “plain and obvious” and “not a close call.”
In his October 28 endorsement dismissing the most recent application, Associate Justice Kamal began by explaining the principles of Rule 2.1.01. He noted that the rule provides a summary procedure to dismiss proceedings that are, on their face, frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. He cited past case law stating the rule must be “interpreted and applied robustly” to allow judges to “effectively exercise their gatekeeping function.” The judge clarified that while the court must read the application generously, it is not for “close calls” and is to be used in the “clearest of cases.” The court is also permitted to review the pleadings and decisions from prior proceedings to make its determination.
Associate Justice Kamal found the application to be a clear abuse of process on two grounds: relitigation and collateral attack. He disagreed with Mr. Chijindu’s claim that this was a new cause of action. The judge wrote, “this Application essentially seeks to revive the previous application… This is the third proceeding directed at the LSO’s revocation decision… Mr. Chijindu reuses arguments that have been heard and decided in an effort to revisit a final decision he clearly does not agree with.” The judge found that allowing the case to proceed would “violate principles of judicial economy, consistency, finality, and the integrity of the administration of justice.”
The judge further found the application to be an improper collateral attack, which is an attempt to challenge an order in a separate proceeding rather than through a direct appeal. He noted that three previous courts (Justice Akazaki, Justice Parghi, and the Court of Appeal) had already concluded that Mr. Chijindu’s attempts to have his licence reinstated were collateral attacks. Associate Justice Kamal found that this new application was a collateral attack on both the original 2020 revocation and the subsequent court decisions that dismissed his other challenges. The judge also rejected Mr. Chijindu’s interpretation of a Supreme Court case, clarifying that a collateral attack is not permitted when, as was the case here, the applicant did have a proper forum (the Law Society Tribunal) to raise his Charter arguments in the first place.
Associate Justice Kamal then determined the application was also “vexatious,” meaning it was brought for an improper purpose. He applied a legal test that identifies common attributes of vexatious litigation. First, he found Mr. Chijindu brought “multiple proceedings to try to re-determine an issue that has already been determined.” Second, he found Mr. Chijindu was “rolling forward grounds and issues from prior proceedings,” simply reframing his old arguments under the guise of a new Charter claim. Third, the judge noted Mr. Chijindu’s “persistent pursuit of unsuccessful appeals” to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court was another hallmark of vexatious conduct.
Finally, the judge addressed the fourth attribute: bringing proceedings where “no reasonable person would expect to obtain the relief sought.” He addressed Mr. Chijindu’s core argument that his Charter claim had a right to be heard on its merits. Associate Justice Kamal wrote that Mr. Chijindu “conflates the right to apply to a court… with the right to have a Charter claim heard on its merits.” He affirmed, “There is no inherent right to have Charter claims proceed through to a hearing, especially where the proceeding itself is a collateral attack.” The judge noted that the Court of Appeal had already dismissed this exact argument. He concluded, “no reasonable person would expect to obtain the relief sought.”
Lastly, the court found the application to be “frivolous,” meaning it lacked any legal basis or merit. The judge stated that the Superior Court simply does not have the jurisdiction to declare the Law Society Tribunal’s revocation decision “null and void,” an issue that Justice Akazaki had already decided and the Court of Appeal had affirmed. Because Mr. Chijindu’s central assertion that he has an automatic right to a hearing on the merits is “simply not supported in law,” the entire application was deemed frivolous on its face.
For all of these reasons, Associate Justice Kamal found the application to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process. The application was dismissed.
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