TORONTO – The Law Society Tribunal of Ontario has ruled that the vast majority of evidence filed against a lawyer facing a criminal fraud charge must be made public, reinforcing the high value placed on the open court principle in professional disciplinary proceedings1. The decision, released on September 10, 2025, largely dismissed a motion by lawyer Crystal Diane Masterson to redact or place a publication ban on extensive materials gathered by the Law Society of Ontario during its investigation into her conduct.
The legal dispute over transparency began after Ms. Masterson was charged with fraud over $5,000 on March 27, 2025, in connection with her alleged role in a Ponzi scheme. As required by professional regulations, she promptly self-reported the criminal charge to the Law Society, which triggered a formal investigation. As part of that investigation, Ms. Masterson was interviewed by Law Society officials on April 8 and 9, 2025. Following this, on May 13, 2025, the Law Society brought a motion seeking an interlocutory suspension of her license to practise law, a temporary measure to protect the public while the full disciplinary process unfolds.
In support of its suspension motion, the Law Society filed a voluminous record of evidence, described by the tribunal as appearing to be the “bulk of the Law Society’s investigation.” This record included the complete transcript of Ms. Masterson’s compelled interview and text messages she had provided as part of her duty to cooperate with the regulator.
The issue of public access first arose during a proceeding management conference on June 10, 2025, when Ms. Masterson’s lawyers expressed significant concerns about the contents of the Law Society’s evidence file. The Tribunal Chair ordered the materials to be temporarily marked “not public” until the matter could be properly addressed. At the suspension hearing on June 12, the parties were able to agree on a narrow set of redactions, mostly pertaining to information protected by solicitor-client and settlement privilege. However, disagreement remained over a large volume of other information, prompting Ms. Masterson to formally bring a Rule 13 motion to restrict public access.
While this motion was pending, Ms. Masterson consented to the interlocutory suspension of her licence without admitting any wrongdoing. The suspension was granted, with the tribunal noting the criminal charges alone met the necessary threshold. The hearing proceeded without any public reference to the contested evidence.
In her motion for secrecy, Ms. Masterson argued that making the contested materials public would create a serious risk to several important interests. Her primary concern was the potential violation of her constitutional right to a fair criminal trial. She contended that publicizing her compelled statements to the Law Society would undermine her right to remain silent and her protection against self-incrimination. Her lawyers argued that this could lead to the tainting of a potential jury pool, allow witnesses and her co-accused to tailor their evidence against her, and improperly place evidence before a trier of fact in the criminal case.
Furthermore, Ms. Masterson argued that the materials contained “deeply personal and intimately financial information” about her family, her relationships, and her finances. She asserted that the release of this information would be an affront to her dignity and was unnecessary for the public to understand the basis of her suspension, especially since she had consented to it. She also raised concerns about fairness to third parties, including her co-accused in the criminal matter and alleged victims of the scheme, whose personal information was contained in the record.
The Law Society and The Hamilton Spectator, a media outlet that intervened in the motion to argue for openness, vigorously opposed the request for secrecy. They contended that Ms. Masterson’s claims of potential harm to her criminal trial were speculative. The Law Society argued that the criminal justice system has robust, built-in safeguards, such as jury instructions and the ability to challenge evidence, to protect an accused person’s right to a fair trial. They also pointed out that much of the information Ms. Masterson sought to protect, including details about her finances and family, was already in the public domain through media reports and filings in related civil lawsuits.
In her detailed reasons for decision, Adjudicator Natalia Rodriguez first addressed Ms. Masterson’s argument that the Law Society should not have filed such an extensive record for what became an uncontested suspension. The adjudicator affirmed the principle of “prosecutorial discretion,” stating that the tribunal will not interfere with the Law Society’s decisions on what evidence to file unless there is clear evidence of improper motives or bad faith, which was not present in this case.
Adjudicator Rodriguez then applied the legal test for limiting openness established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sherman Estate v. Donovan. The test requires the party seeking secrecy to prove that openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest, that the requested order is necessary to prevent that risk, and that the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.
Analyzing Ms. Masterson’s arguments through this lens, the adjudicator found they largely fell short. She dismissed the claims of spousal and settlement privilege, finding they were not applicable to the information in question. Regarding the personal and financial information, she noted that the bar for invoking privacy and dignity as a public interest is extremely high, requiring more than just embarrassment. She found most of the information did not meet this threshold. However, she did order the temporary redaction of a small portion of a transcript, less than one page, that contained text message exchanges of a “sensitive nature” that were “unnecessarily salacious” and irrelevant to the allegations.
The adjudicator did find merit in the argument concerning fairness to third parties, specifically the alleged victims of the Ponzi scheme whose names were not yet public. She ruled that identifying them could adversely affect their reputations without giving them an opportunity to respond. To prevent this, she ordered a temporary publication ban on the names of these individuals until the conclusion of Ms. Masterson’s criminal proceedings. She also ordered the permanent redaction of a police officer’s phone number, deeming it irrelevant sensitive personal information.
On the central issue of the right to a fair trial, Adjudicator Rodriguez concluded that the risks were speculative. She explained that under Canadian law, while incriminating evidence compelled in one proceeding cannot be used to prove guilt in another, non-incriminating evidence can be used to challenge an accused’s credibility. She determined that making the evidence public did not create a serious risk to Ms. Masterson’s Charter rights, as procedural safeguards in the criminal court could address any issues that might arise. The adjudicator was also not persuaded that media publicity would irreparably taint a future jury pool, citing legal precedent that places faith in jurors’ ability to follow judicial instructions.
Ultimately, the tribunal granted only a small fraction of the relief Ms. Masterson had sought. The decision orders a temporary publication ban on the names of non-public victims, the temporary redaction of one page of a transcript, and the permanent redaction of a phone number. The remainder of the nearly 1,500-page evidence record filed by the Law Society will be made public once these specific changes are made.
Read more cases about proceedings in regulated professions here.
